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ABSTRACT. Land is an essential factor of production. Institutions that govern its effi-
cient use determine the sustainability of this essential resource. In Ethiopia all land is
publicly owned. Such an institutional setting is said to have resulted in the major degra-
dation of Ethiopia’s land resources and dissipation of the resource rent. An alternative
to this is assigning a private property institution. In this paper, we examine the con-
sumer welfare effects of a change in the institutional setting on communal forest and
grazing lands, using a cross-section data set of 200 households in Northern Ethiopia.
Findings suggest that changing the current institutional setting could indeed be welfare
reducing.
1. Introduction
Land is an essential factor of production for agriculture and forestry as well
as other land-related activities. In many developing countries, the inefficient
use or exploitation of land reduces the amount of resource rent that can be
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collected, while lowering available future resource rents as land resources
degrade over time. Consequently, poverty combined with a lack of appro-
priate institutions1 governing land use causes peasants to invest too little in
land improvements. A cycle of land degradation occurs because, as forests
are mined, people turn to grasses, crop residues and livestock dung for fuel,
which decreases the productive capacity of the land further (Pearce and
Warford, 1993).
Land in Ethiopia is publicly owned with farmers having usufruct rights.2
Except for trees on backyards and farmlands on which farmers have use
rights to the land, forests/trees and grazing lands remain largely free access
resources within their respective communities. Under such an institutional
setting or an unrestricted access condition, agents would maximize their
own benefits by putting in effort to the extent that average revenue equals
marginal cost, instead of marginal revenue being equal to marginal cost (van
Kooten and Bulte, 2000). Under open access, no agent will have an incentive
to delay harvest, as doing so would only enhance the harvest opportu-
nities of others. The outcome is excess depletion and dissipation of the
resource rent.3 Rural communities in Ethiopia depend considerably on com-
mon property resources for their livelihoods, including for irrigation water,
fuelwood, construction material and livestock grazing (Gebremedhin et al.,
2003, 2004; McCarthy, 2004). However, population pressure, market and
government failure, tenure insecurity and particularly the absence or inef-
fectiveness of use regulations of common property resources have resulted
in the severe degradation of the resources (Hagos et al., 1999). Therefore,
it would indeed be of public interest to enhance tenure security and alter
this situation. An extreme case of this would be enforcing a private prop-
erty institution. An interesting question here is how a public policy aiming
at altering the status quo would affect total welfare or the welfare of private
agents. What would be an optimal institutional arrangement worth doing
in terms of addressing the problem? By and large, there appear to be two
opposing viewswith regard to land use/ownership in the country. One view
favors the status quo, i.e., state stewardship of land, and the other favors a
private property institution. Although these policy options on land owner-
ship are contemplated on different grounds such as efficiency, equity and
sustainability, they are not without welfare costs at an individual household
1 Institutions are systems of rules/norms that specify certain forms of action as per-
missible but others as forbidden, and provide for certain penalties and defense
when violations occur (Runge, 1984). Through shaping the behavior of people
with respect to one another and their belongings, possessions and property, insti-
tutions provide assurance by setting out the ‘rules of the game’. These rules,
hence, affect the welfare of agents through their effect on the rate of resource use
and the distribution of returns. By coordinating behavior and reducing uncer-
tainty in the realm of human interaction, they increase the value of a stream of
benefits associated with economic activity.
2 Article 40 of Ethiopia’s Constitution states: ‘the right to ownership of rural and
urban land is exclusively vested in the state . . . and shall not be subject to sale or
exchange’ (FDRE, 1995).
3 For details about property rights/institutions, economic dynamics and rent cap-
ture, see van Kooten and Bulte (2000).
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level. Therefore, it would be of great interest to empirically evaluate the wel-
fare effect of completely enforcing a private property institution to forest and
grazing lands that are not privately held.
Alemu (1999) analyzed the perceptions of farmers of the land tenure
system prevailing in Ethiopia as well as their willingness to pay for insti-
tutionalizing more secured tenure. He found that a large proportion of the
sample households are willing to pay for a change in the existing tenure
arrangements towards private property. In a study of the attitude of farm-
ers towards the complete ownership of land, Semie (2010) found that about
85 per cent of sample households favored complete ownership of farmland.
Gebeyehu (2000) also investigated the impact of the type of tenure on the
technical efficiency of farmers, i.e., by considering owner-operators vs. ten-
ants. He concluded that type of tenure did not bring about an observable
difference in mean technical efficiency across the two groups.
The purpose of the current study is to examine the welfare impact of the
policy of assigning a private property institution to communal forest and
grazing lands using a data set covering a cross-section of 200 households in
Tigrai region, northern Ethiopia. More specifically, in this paper we exam-
ine the welfare effects from the consumer’s perspective of a change in the
institutional setting to communal forest and grazing lands. Such a change
in the institutional setting could be envisaged to counter the dissipation of
the resource rent and hence the degradation of forest and grazing lands.
We also draw implications from our findings. We begin in the next section
with the theory on institutions and resource degradation. Land use in Tigrai
is presented in section 3. In section 4 we present the theoretical model of
the household’s maximization problem along with a framework for analyz-
ing/capturing the welfare effects of the change in the institutional setting.
In section 5 we outline the empirical model. Section 6 presents results and
discussion. We conclude by drawing some policy/research implications in
section 7.
2. Institutions and resources degradation: review of theories
Renewable natural resources such as forests, grazing lands and fisheries con-
stitute a significant part of our planet. Rural communities in developing
countries depend primarily on these resources for fuelwood, construction
material and livestock grazing. These resources are also important sources
of livelihood elsewhere in the world. However, due to unrestricted access
by users or in the absence of effective use regulations (rule structures),
these resources are subject to overexploitation on a first-come, first-served
basis. Alternative theories have been developed to explain the common
pool resources problem. Three alternative theories are quite apparent in
the literature. The structure of these theories ranges from a simple deci-
sion framework involving the interactions of economic and biological factors
(e.g., Gordon, 1954) to a more complex game theoretic framework involving
strategic interaction among multi-agents (e.g., Cheung, 1970; Runge, 1981).
The first line of theory ascribes the common pool resource problem to a
self-centered behavior or ‘the free-rider problem’ (Hume, 1740; Brubaker
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1975; Smith, 1981). According to this theory, motivated by narrow self-
interest, each individual would tend to choose and/or behave indepen-
dently to utilize the resource at an exploitative level in the expectation that
others will do the same, leading to a situation in which all are made worse
off. Because part of the cost is borne by the entire group involved in using the
resource, the social cost of harvesting an additional unit of a common pool
resource exceeds the private cost. This is presumed to give individual agents
an incentive to enjoy free-riding, which finally ends up in overexploitation.
Often, a simple prisoner’s dilemma game model is used to explain the situa-
tion. Therefore, the implication is that the incentive for free-riding or narrow
self-centered behavior could be avoided through completely defined private
property rights to the resources.
The second line of theory attributes the common property problem as an
enforcement problem. For those like Hardin (1968) and Johnson (1972), the
problem of common property externality, i.e., ‘the tragedy of the commons’
can only be resolved through imposition and enforcement of use rules by
an external enforcer, the government. Hardin sees ‘mutual coercion, mutu-
ally agreed upon by the majority of the people affected’, and an external
authority, the ‘custodians’, by which restrained access can be enforced, as
the only viable option. According to this line of theory, when a group of
people is placed in a setting where upon all adopting a rule of restrained use
of a common pool resource they could mutually benefit, they will not do so
in the absence of an external enforcer of agreements. This is because each
agent has an incentive to ignore the social cost of his harvest for fear that
other agents will capture the benefits ahead of him.
The third line of theory belongs to the cooperative or conditional coopera-
tive view. This view gives much importance to what is called ‘assurance and
uncertainty’ in predicating the behavior patterns of actors and argues that
the institutional rules innovated by the users that help to reduce uncertainty
and coordinate expectations are the best solutions to resolve the problem
(Runge, 1981). This line of argument emphasizes the idea that individuals
are interdependent because of the non-separability of the cost functions that
face them, and thus each individual bases her decisions on the expected
actions of others. For them, the problem of the common property external-
ity is uncertainty, and some kind of institutional solution which can confirm
assurance can easily solve it (Wade, 1986). Indeed, Runge argues that no
player has an incentive to defect in a situation where everybody cooperates;
it is possible for the players to assure each other that everybody chooses to
cooperate and thus reach a stable cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Provencher and Burt (1994) document a set of evidence where the central
control of water resources (be it surface or groundwater deliveries) offers
virtually no gain over the common property arrangements. Provencher and
Burt compare the social welfare of pumping groundwater under central
(optimal) control to that obtained under a private property rights regime
in Madera County, California using a stochastic dynamic programming
model. In this case, a private property rights regime is a market setting
where firms/agents are granted transferable/tradable permits to the in situ
groundwater stock. They find that when agents are risk averse, both regimes
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are suboptimal. In contrast, when agents are risk neutral, central control
dominates the private property rights regime, but they argue that the private
property rights regime is a promising alternative and may yield greater wel-
fare becausemarkets for permits provide opportunities for riskmanagement
not available under central control. Adhikari et al. (2004) also cast doubts
on the grand optimism observed in much of the common literature on the
viability of community-based resource management regimes and the idea
that they can ensure egalitarian access and equitable distribution among its
co-owners.
On the other hand, Wade (1987) argues that both private property regimes
and state control regimes are expensive to make effective and that villagers
can sustain locally based rules and avert the tragedy through restrained
access to common property resources. This is simply because the already
overstretched states in developing countries may not be able to provide
the necessary resources to make them work across myriad micro-locations.
Sterner (2003) also notes that in some circumstances the productivity of the
land may be too low to cover the basic costs of enforcing private property
institutions, for example when the services provided by a certain ecosystem
are meager, such as pasture in extremely dry areas. Wade also outlines the
likelihood of successful organization being dependent on the nature of the
resource, the technology, the relationship between resources and user group,
the characteristics of the user group, noticeability and the relationship
between users and the state. According to Ostrom (1990), seven conditions
considered essential for stable common property resources management are:
the boundaries are clear and outsiders can be excluded; rules of provision
and appropriation are adapted to site-specific conditions; decision making
is participatory or democratic; locally designated agents monitor resources;
a local court or other arena is available to resolve conflicts; graduated sanc-
tions are used to punish infringements; and outside government respects
the common property institutions. Runge (1986) argues that widespread
attempts to privatize forests, rangelands and water resources, because of the
mismanagement of natural resources caused by common property arrange-
ments, have failed to stop overuse, and have contributed to inequality in
resource distribution. Runge describes a number of reasons why common
property may continue to be both efficient and equitable and posits that
complementing and combining with private rights in a way consistent with
the resource endowments of village economies is better than substituting it.
In conclusion, the following issues turn out to be quite apparent from the
foregoing review. Firstly, although alternative theories have been postulated
to explain the common pool resources problem, it still remains unresolved.
In fact Ostrom (2009) argues that developing a coherent theory of collective
action related to the use of common property resources has proved to be
a real challenge. In addition, the implications/predictions of these alterna-
tive theories in terms of the proposed solution to the problem have been
quite variable and no compelling evidence exists as yet in favor of or against
either of these postulations. Moreover, apart for some experimental evidence
on the common pool problem that originates mainly from experiments in
laboratory settings of Western countries, empirical evidence that attempted
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to test these alternative postulations, particularly in the context of develop-
ing countries, is extremely scanty. Therefore, there is a need for more careful
empirical research into the welfare implications of institutional alternatives
in common pool resources management.
3. Land use in Tigrai
The Tigrai region covers a total land area of about 50,000 km2 (table 1).
Of this total landmass about 25 per cent is cultivated, and forest/grazing
lands constitute about 37 per cent (Gebreegziabher, 2007). Historically, insti-
tutions/property rights to land in Ethiopia were vested in either the rist
system, the gult system/private land holding, or the church. The rist4 system
was the dominant type of land tenure in Tigrai before the 1975 land reform.
It was a communal land tenure in which the right to land was not exclusive
but shared. Under this system, an individual had usufruct rights to land (rist
rights) in a given community only if she was able to establish a direct line
of descent from the recognized original holder of the land. Nevertheless, the
individual’s usufruct rights to land were not transferable to others through
sale or mortgage, though there was room for temporary lease. Moreover,
as the right to land under the rist system did not imply a right to any spe-
cific parcel, land redistribution was undertaken periodically to ensure that
new entrants/family members were granted access. This resulted in land
fragmentation. In addition, the fact that any person’s land parcels might be
reallocated to distant kinsmen/women and that no one could sell them for
a profit or leave them to an heir reduced a farmer’s incentive to invest in
long-term land improvements and hence resulted in land quality deterio-
ration (Hoben, 1995; Hagos et al., 1999). The gult system was characterized
by absentee owners, as it was the royal kinsmen/women who had the gult




Zone Male Female Total (km2) (persons/km2)
Tigrai overall 2,124.8 2,189.6 4,314.4 50,078.64 86.1
Western 183.0 174.5 357.5 12,441.26 28.7
Northwestern 367.6 368.3 735.9 12,267.58 60.0
Central 613.2 632.0 1,245.2 10,353.50 120.3
Eastern 359.7 395.9 755.6 5,705.34 132.4
Southern 496.5 508.1 1,004.6 9,286.52 108.4
Mekelle
(Metropolitan)
104.8 110.8 215.6 24.44 8819.4
Source: CSA (2004) and FDRE PCC (2008).
4 As was the case in the rest of Africa (Besley, 1995), rist system/communal land
tenure may be regarded as egalitarian in the sense that the distribution was based
on the principle of equality, with the land allocated by lottery after being divided
into parcels according to quality.
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holdings (Hussein, 2004). With the 1975 land reform (Proclamation No. 31,
1975), these previous systems of tenancy were abolished (Nickola, 1988).
Three distinctions are now made regarding rights to trees/forests in
the country at large and Tigrai in particular (Gebreegziabher, 2007). These
are private/individual tree holdings, community forests (woodlots) and state
forests. The private/individual tree holdings include trees privately grown
around homesteads and cultivated land for various purposes which fall
under the category technically referred to as agro/farm forestry. It also
includes indigenous trees kept/managed on privately held land for vari-
ous purposes. Arguably, property rights here are vested in the individual
farmer/holder. That is, the holder (farmer) is free to make use of, sell or
rent the yield, berries or exudes of such trees found on his/her land, except
for the policy restrictions that the land cannot be sold or mortgaged. The
community forests (woodlots) are area enclosures and community planta-
tions where the rights are vested in the respective communities. State forests
constitute natural forests preserved for biodiversity conservation and other
purposes where the property rights are vested in the state. It could be
either national forest priority areas (NFPAs) or regional forest priority areas
(RFPAs). Cross-boundary forest areas also fall within the category of state
forests. Grazing lands in the region also remain largely common property
resources used under different management regimes where respective com-
munities collectively own and exercise control over a clearly delineated
section of the entire resource.
However, population pressure, market and government failure, tenure
insecurity, and lack of effectiveness in internal governance, particularly the
absence or ineffectiveness of use regulations of common property resources,
have resulted in severe degradation of the resources (Hagos et al., 1999;
Gebremedhin et al., 2003, 2004). In addition, the erosion of common property
institutions for various reasons as well as the non-recognition of common
property systems are also among the threats to these resources. It appears
that it was after the 1975 land reform which made land public property
in Ethiopia that common property institutions came to be seriously threat-
ened (Gebreegziabher, 1999). This is mainly because, firstly, the land reform
brought about the sentiment that ‘land belongs to everybody’, that ‘land is
the property of the state’, and this sentiment resulted in increased outsiders’
pressure on the common pool resources. Secondly, as a result of subsequent
changes in the political and administrative system, there was a reorgani-
zation and merger of two or more villages into one in which owners of a
common pool resource were merged with other villages with no original
claim over the resource. This, in some contexts, resulted in the erosion of
common property institutions. But, more importantly, as explained in the
preceding section, common pool resources may be subject to externalities
and these externalities open up the possibility that these resources are not
managed efficiently (McCarthy, 2004).
Moreover, fuelwood and dung remain largely free access resources. For
example, free collection accounted for the dominant part of all household
fuel uses in our sample (table 2). Natural forests and grazing lands were
found to be the major sources of freely collected fuels with private sources
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Table 2. Distribution of sample households by method of
acquiring fuel
Fuel type
Mode of acquisition Fuelwood (%) Dung (%)
Free collection 85.2 72.3
Buying 11.2 0.6
Own source (tree/cattle manure) 3.6 27.1
Total (n = 200) 100.0 100.0
Table 3. Distribution of sample households by source of
collected fuels by fuel type
Fuel type
Source Wood (%) Dung (%)
Own farmland/backyard 15.0 33.0
Others’ farmland – 5.0
Grazing land 33.0 50.5
Forest land 52.0 –
Total (n = 200) 100.0 88.5a
aThe remaining are households not using dung at all.
constituting a lesser proportion (table 3). As a result of the free and uncon-
trolled grazing system that is prevalent in the region, livestock stay outside
for most of the day both grazing/browsing and searching for feed. Eventu-
ally, the animals leave their manure/dung, which is free for use by anyone
and there is no defined ownership right to it. For instance, dung collected
from rural hinterlands accounts for a significant portion of total household
cooking fuel in some towns in Tigrai (Newcombe, 1989). This degrades
the land further. As is clear from the preceding section, alternative solu-
tions have been proposed to solve this problem, including the privatization,
imposition and enforcement of use rules by external forces such as the
government, or state ownership of the resources. Often privatization, i.e.,
enforcing a private property institution, is seen as a panacea to the com-
mon pool resources problem. Therefore, we here examine consumer welfare
effects of enforcing a private property institution5 on common property
resources and contribute to the debate.
5 It is important to note that by ‘private property institution’ we mean private
management of the resource, as compared to common property resource. Private
property would imply that the property holders have the right to sell the resource.
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4. Theoretical model
4.1. Households’ maximization problem
Consider the case of a consumer who is assumed to behave as if maximizing
a well-behaved utility function defined over the quantities of commodities
consumed q and environmental and household characteristics z, subject to
budget constraint m. Let the household’s utility function be specified as
(Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995):
u = u(q, z). (1)
Solving for the Lagrangian function of the household’s utility maximization
problem in the usual procedure and assuming the second-order conditions
are satisfied gives us the ordinary (observed) demand function:
q = q(p, m). (2)
Substituting the demand function derived from this constrained maximiza-
tion into u in (1) gives us the indirect utility function:
u = v(p, m). (3)
The indirect utility function v(·) is the maximum utility that the household
can reach for given prices p and income m.
4.2. Welfare effects of change in an institutional setting
Now consider a change in price of the ith good, pi , from p0i to p1i resulting
from some public policy. For instance, such a public policy might emanate
from the intention to change the existing institutional setting governing
communal forest and grazing lands, e.g., fuelwood and dung, to alter the
open access condition and curb the devastation. Before proceeding, it is
important to note that we assume weak separability among the vector of
commodities or goods q in equation (1). Specifically, we assume separabil-
ity between these two goods of interest and the rest of the commodities
in q so that we can concentrate our analysis on the two goods of interest
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). It could be envisaged that welfare depends
not only on fuelwood and dung but also on other products of common
pool resources such as timber and fodder/grass. However, we are focus-
ing only on fuelwood and dung because of data limitations. Specifically, we
assume that price of wood and dung change with all other things remain-
ing unchanged. We assume all others remain unchanged, firstly because the
rest of the variables are not directly/significantly affected by the envisaged
change in institutional setting. Or, put differently, they change so slowly
relative to the changes in the variables of interest that they can be taken
as practically constant at any point in time. Secondly, holding all the other
factors constant allows us to focus on the unique effects of the variables of
interest by simplifying the complexity of the causal setting.
Now, imagine a public scheme aimed at enforcing a private property insti-
tution to forest/wood resources and grazing lands. Three policy alternatives
could be envisaged at the disposal of a policy maker: (1) completely defin-
ing/enforcing a private property institution only for wood resources with
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grazing lands left intact; (2) completely defining a private property insti-
tution only for grazing lands with forest/wood resources left intact; and,
(3) defining a private property institution both on forest/wood resources
and grazing lands simultaneously. For tractability of the problem at hand
we make the following simplifying assumptions: (i) the cost of completely
defining private property rights is zero6; (ii) to circumvent the skepticism
that a private property institution might lead to imperfect competition and
guarantee that harvests are socially optimal, we assume that the privatiza-
tion scheme is reasonably fair and does not result in imperfect competition;
(iii) households will separate (discriminate) into buyers and sellers (resource
owners) in fuel and face the same equilibrium price7; (iv) as wood and dung
are no longer freely collected, privatization ultimately translates itself into
increased prices.8 Nonetheless, in general, the extent to which prices increase
cannot be determined a priori.
The mechanism for operationalizing a private property institution is that
agents are granted an endowment of tradable/transferable permits/deeds
to the in situ resources, which they control over time. Specifically, individu-
als, in our case the landless and youth, are assigned parcels of communal
forest/grazing lands for which they will have title deeds. These deeds
carefully define/specify the boundaries, as boundaries are so important in
resolving disputes. Deeds are distributed in lots through a lottery method,
as experienced in the previous redistribution or reallocation of cultivated
land. And each lot has fair share, both in quality and quantity, of the present
communal natural resource stock. The role of the regulator is confined to
choosing the initial allocation of the endowments of permits/deeds and
developing the rule governing the game.
Suppose that (p0i , m0) and (p1i , m1) measure the prices and incomes that
our representative consumer would face under the two (different) policy
regimes for i = f, d, respectively standing for wood and dung as in above.
(p0i , m0) represents the status quo where p0 and m0 denote initial prices and
income levels while (p1i , m1) represents the proposed change with the new
6 There is rich experience in the handling of this matter and, in fact, previous land
redistributions (reallocations) including the most recent land certification pro-
gram in the study area were all carried out at nearly zero or very low cost. Details
about this can be found in Deininger (2008) and Holden et al. (2009).
7 Households are assumed to discriminate into either buyers or sellers and not to
both buyers and sellers because, firstly, free collection from communal sources
accounts for the largest part of the fuel consumed in the study area. Secondly, if
there is anything to be given, the current policy allows the land to be given to the
landless and youth.
8 There are two reasons why enforcing a private property institution ultimately
translates itself into increased prices: the first is due to marginal user cost. An
efficient market would have to consider not only the marginal extraction cost for
the resource, but the marginal user cost as well. Hence, agents will take care of
the scarcity rent of the resource. The second reason that the value of the resources
is greater under the private property institution than under the status quo per-
tains to the risk-averse behavior of agents, i.e., resource owners (Sadoulet and de
Janvry, 1995).
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levels of prices and income respectively. How would, then, such price (pol-
icy) change affect the agents’ wellbeing? Following Sadoulet and de Janvry
(1995), the welfare change involved in moving from (p0i , m0) to (p1i , m1) can
be expressed as the difference in indirect utility function:
u = v(p1i , m1) − v(p0i , m0). (4)
The intuition is that if the utility difference in equation (4), as far as our
agent is concerned, turns out to be positive, the change in institutional set-
tingwould beworth doing; it is not worth doing if it turns out to be negative.
However, note that utility theory/measure as in equation (4) is purely ordi-
nal, but our interest is to quantify the utility/welfare change in monetary
terms. Therefore, we need a convenient monetary measure of changes in our
agent’s welfare. We considered the equivalent variation (EV) as the motiva-
tion to get a reasonable indicator of the likely welfare effects of price (policy)
change being examined.9 Moreover, the EV is quite straightforward in that
it uses current prices as the base and asks what income change at the current
price would be equivalent to the proposed change in terms of its impact on
utility. As noted by Freeman (1993), the EV measure will consistently rank
two or more policy changes provided that society is indifferent as to the dis-
tribution of gains and losses across individuals. Therefore, we specify the
EV as follows:
EV = e(p0, u1) − e(p0, u0) = e(p0, u1) − m0, (5)
where u1 stands for utility level with changed prices.10 Given initial prices
and income, equation (5) could be computed for individual or simultaneous
price (policy) changes. Apart from the magnitude, the direction of change as
implied by the sign of the outcome is also important.
5. Empirical model and data
5.1. Empirical model
Essentially equation (5) is the relationship that enables us to mea-
sure/capture the effects of price (policy) change in some monetary form.
Note that the first term in (5), e(p0, u1), is the income level at which our rep-
resentative agent achieves utility level u1 at prices p0. And e(p0, u1)– m0 is
the net change in income that causes our agent to get utility u1 at prices p0.
Assuming a Cobb–Douglas utility function, starting from the indirect util-
ity function, equation (2), and making use of the expenditure function, we
computed the welfare effects using a money metric indirect utility function.
9 For a further understanding of alternative welfare measures, CV (compensated
variation) and CS (consumers’ surplus), see Varian (1992: 160–163) andMas-Colell
et al. (1995: 80–91).
10 Note that, alternatively, equation (5) could also be represented as
EV = e( p¯, v(p1, m)) − e( p¯, v(p0, m)) = e( p¯, v(p1, m)) − m0,
for an arbitrary price vector p¯ >> 0, and gives the income required to reach the
utility level v(p, m) when prices are p¯.
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More specifically, for numerical computation of the welfare changes we used
the following money metric indirect utility function:11









where W stands for welfare and  for change.
Three things appear quite important for the numerical computation of
welfare change using equation (6): numerical estimates/values of the substi-
tution elasticities, i.e., α and β parameters; prices (shadow), p0i and p1i ; and
income/expenditure on fuel, m. Free collection accounts for the majority of
the fuels consumed in the study area. The households considered use family
labor in fuel collection. Though fuelwood is traded in the towns in the vicin-
ity of the study sites, a lesser proportion of the households were involved
in fuelwood buying (table 2). Almost none of the sample households was
involved in buying dung. Moreover, hiring labor for fuel collection is not
common practice. Hence, it was clear that hired labor and family labor
are not perfect substitutes and market wage rate cannot be taken as an
appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of family labor used in fuel col-
lection. Therefore, under such imperfect/missingmarket conditions, ‘virtual
(shadow) prices’12 are appropriate measures (Singh et al., 1986) and we used
these prices in our analysis. The shadowprices were computed from the data
set following the standard procedure in the literature.13 And their average
values were taken as initial prices in thewelfare change calculations. Assum-
ing the utility function associated with wood and dung is of the form14:
u(q) = qαf qβd , (7)
where q f and qd are quantities of wood and dung consumed by a household
with α, β ∈ (0, 1) and α + β <= 1. To find the parameter values/numerical
estimates of the substitution elasticities α and β, we estimated the trans-
formed form of (7).15 Hence, given initial prices and expenditure on the two
fuels, and parameter values, α and β, we can now calculate the welfare
effects for three different scenarios: independent price (policy) change for
ith good holding the other constant and simultaneous price (policy) change
for both goods.
11 For details of the derivation of the money metric indirect utility function,
please see Mathematical Appendix 1, available in the online appendix at
http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE.
12 Note the prices (shadow) are the outcomes of households’ optimization in the
classic case of the non-separable household model (Singh et al., 1986). However,
this ceases to be the case in the context of the new policy/institutional regime.
13 For further details see Jacoby (1993), Thornton (1994), Mekonnen (1999), Ko¨hlin
and Parks (2001) and Amacher et al. (2004).
14 It is important to note that the choice of the Cobb–Douglas utility function was
based on the convenience it offers in dealing with the two goods model. It is the
simplest form and widely used in empirical work. Moreover, the Cobb–Douglas
form has an interesting property that preferences are homothetic.
15 For details of the estimation procedure, please see Mathematical Appendix 2,
available in the online appendix.
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5.2. Data and sampling design
The data used in this paper come from a survey of 200 cross-section house-
holds conducted in 2000 in Tigrai region, northern Ethiopia. Two-stage
sampling was used to select the sample households. First 50 tabias/kebeles –
the smallest administrative unit in the region – were randomly selected
from a total of 600 available tabias, and then a random sample of 200
households was selected from these tabias. A survey method was employed
in this research for data collection. A questionnaire that can generate the
desired data was designed and pre-tested at field level for verification and
further modifications. The survey was administered in Tigrigna (the local
language) using two enumerators who were trained for the data collection.
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected on the cooking/baking
frequencies of households, household’s production (collection) and con-
sumption of various biomass fuel types, and issues regarding household
income, demographic characteristics of the household including age, sex
and literacy level of the household head, and household size. Responses on
the amount of the different fuel types consumed by the household were col-
lected in local units. Every local unit was measured for each household to
facilitate conversion into metric units and minimize error. Qualitative data
collected included reasons for preference of particular fuel type, mode of
acquisition of the various fuels used, sources of collected fuels, etc. Also
obtained from the survey were family resource endowments including total
time endowment and labor allocation to various activities, total land hold-
ing, land area cultivated, and livestock holdings of households, village level
factors including agro-ecological conditions or altitude range and distance
traveled (time spent) to collect different fuels. Summary statistics of the
variables considered in the analysis are presented in table 4.
Data on cooking/baking frequencies of households was weighted for
respective end use share in the total household fuel (EESRC, 1995).
Table 4. Summary statistics of variables considered in the analysis (n = 200)
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Family size 5 2 1 12
Household expenditure on fuel
(Eth Birra/month)
140.012 94.227 9.958 647.083
Number of cattle 4 3 0 14
Cooking frequency (monthly) 52.989 19.670 12.742 210.315
Wood price/shadow (Eth
Birr/hour)
1.483 7.285 0 18.376
Dung price/shadow (Eth
Birr/hour)
0.266 0.849 0 3.618
Wood consumption (kg/month) 117.875 86.310 0 420
Dung consumption (kg/month) 90.034 94.570 0 628.5
Kerosene consumption
(liter/month)
1.745 6.890 0.11 97.68
aEth Birr is the Ethiopian currency: US$ 1 = 13.49 Eth Birr as of 12 March
2010.
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6. Results and discussion
First, empirical estimates of parameters of substitution elasticities between
the two goods were obtained using the Cobb–Douglas utility function. All
the coefficients/parameters turned out to be highly significant, i.e., at the 1
per cent level (table 5). Having estimated parameters α = 0.6, β = 0.25; and
considering p0f = 1.50 Ethiopian Birr (Eth Birr), p0d = 0.25, and m0 = 140.00
as initial prices and expenditure on fuel we analyzed the likely effect(s)
of price change, say from p0i to p1i , resulting from change in institutional
setting that could be envisaged to alter the open-access conditions of the
fuel resources, on the wellbeing of a representative agent/consumer. The
respective average values in the data set were taken as initial prices and
expenditure on fuel for our representative agent. Effects on the agent’s well-
being were analyzed numerically under three alternative scenarios: first,
price of dung (pd) changes while wood price is held unchanged; second,
price of wood (p f ) changes and price of dung is held unchanged; and, third,
simultaneous change in both prices. Because the extent to which the change
in policy increases prices cannot be determined a priori, we computed the
welfare effects of the policy change for alternative price levels. Three dif-
ferent levels of prices, i.e., 25, 50 and 100 per cent increase in price were
considered. Our findings reveal there are private welfare costs involved, be
it an independent price (policy) change in the ith good or a simultaneous
price (policy) change in both goods. Results show that an independent 25
per cent increase in price of the ith good would lead to a welfare loss of
some one-twentieth of our agent’s monthly expenditure on fuel, whereas a
simultaneous price increase of a similar amount would increase the welfare
loss to two-twentieths. We found that a simultaneous 25 per cent increase in
the prices of wood and dung results in welfare loss equivalent to an inde-
pendent 50 per cent increase in wood price, with dung price held constant
or 100 per cent increase in dung price, with wood price held constant. On
the whole, we found that the loss in wellbeing is some 7.33–62.33 (Eth Birr),
or about 5–40 per cent of a household’s average monthly expenditure on the
two fuels. A possible explanation for this is that a number of people includ-
ing the poor are dependent on unregulated communal forest and grazing
land and privatization of such land affects these beneficiaries negatively. The
details are provided in table 6.
Table 5. Estimation results (S.E. in parenthesis) of
substitution elasticities (parameters)/Cobb–Douglas






Prob > F 0.000
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level.
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Table 6. Welfare effects of price (policy) change for a representative household under
alternative scenarios and price levels (for α = 0.6, β = 0.25)
Price (Eth Birr)
Income (m) W
Scenario + price combination (Eth Birr) Dung (pd) Wood (p f ) (Eth Birr)
Initial (m0, p0i ) 140.00 0.25 1.50 –
25% increase in pd and
p f held constant
140.00 0.31 1.50 −7.33
25% increase in p f and
pd held constant
140.00 0.25 1.82 −15.54
Simultaneous 25%
increase in p f and pd
140.00 0.31 1.82 −22.06
50% increase in pd and
p f held constant
140.00 0.375 1.50 −13.50
50% increase in p f and
pd held constant
140.00 0.25 2.25 −30.23
Simultaneous 50%
increase in p f and pd
140.00 0.375 2.25 −40.81
100% increase in pd and
p f held constant
140.00 0.50 1.50 −22.27
100% increase in p f and
pd held constant
140.00 0.25 3.00 −47.63
Simultaneous 100%
increase in p f and pd
140.00 0.50 3.00 −62.33
Theoretically, open or uncontrolled access leads to rent dissipation. This
implies that if land is privatized, rent would be captured (maximized)
which, according to economic theory, is welfare-improving. That is, when
price increases, income of the resource owner increases. Hence, the welfare
impact of privatization for those who sell fuelwood could be expected to
increase. However, if there is any land to be given, the current policy allows
the land to be given or redistributed to the landless and youth. Unfortu-
nately, we don’t have landless in our data set and cannot work out the
welfare effects or gains on the producer side. Therefore, the results presented
here represent only the consumer side of the problem.
7. Conclusions and implications
In Ethiopia all land is publicly owned and traditional fuels are collected
mostly freely from the commons under uncontrolled community access
conditions. Such an institutional setting has resulted in the major degra-
dation of Ethiopia’s land resources and dissipation of the resource rent, as
available forest and grazing lands are used sub-optimally. An alternative
to the current institutional setting is to enforce a private property institu-
tion. Using a data set from 200 cross-section households in Tigrai province,
northern Ethiopia, this paper estimates substitution elasticities between two
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fuel goods, wood and dung. We then use these to derive estimates of
the potential consumer welfare costs of implementing a private property
institution on communal forest and grazing lands.
We use average values in the data set as initial prices and income for our
representative consumer to numerically analyze the effects on our agent’s
wellbeing of the policy of enforcing a private property institution under
three alternative scenarios: (1) price of dung changes while wood price
is held unchanged; (2) price of wood changes and price of dung is held
unchanged; and (3) simultaneous change in both prices. Because we can-
not determine a priori the extent to which the change in policy increases
prices, we considered three different price levels. Our findings suggest that
privatization of the currently common pool resources of forest and grazing
lands might indeed be consumer welfare reducing. The findings hold for
an independent price (policy) change in one good or a simultaneous price
(policy) change in both goods and for different price levels. The loss in well-
being is some 7.33–62.33 Eth Birr, or about 5–40 per cent of households’
average monthly expenditure on the two fuels. A possible explanation for
this substantial loss in wellbeing is that a number of people including the
poor are dependent on unregulated communal forest and grazing land and
privatization of such land incurs consumer consumption cost to them. Con-
sidering the welfare loss to consumers only, our results support the status
quo andmight justify the government’s reluctance to impose a private prop-
erty institution on communal forest and grazing lands. However, analysis of
producer welfare implications need to be conducted before firm conclusions
can be drawn.
Our results show that, as far as consumer welfare is concerned, private
management is not preferred, raising the question of how these communal
resources should be managed in order to ensure sustainability. Centralized
management by public agencies is one option. However, major difficulties
with centralized control of resource management relating to informational
problems, problems of enforcement of government rules, corruption and
reluctance to punish violations or at least non-cooperation on the part
of resource users have been observed throughout the developing world
(Baland and Platteau, 1996). Therefore, a community management system
could be a better option, since it allows for the alignment of incentives for
conservation by transferring management of the resources to parties with
the greatest economic stake in their management. Several researchers have
documented the effectiveness of community resource management and the
conditions under which it may work better.
Gebremedhin et al. (2004) posit that collective action in relation to graz-
ing land management may be more beneficial and more effective in areas
with intermediate population, higher social capital, and lower heterogene-
ity in oxen ownership which are far from marketplaces. In a related study,
Gebremedhin et al. (2003) found that community woodlot management may
be more effective and beneficial if done at a more local level, when the
role of external organizations is demand-driven, and when promoted in
intermediate population density, and in communities more distant from
marketplaces. Other studies showed that community resource management
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would be effective in situations where the resource is vital to the livelihood
of the people, when the resource has clear boundaries and outsiders are
excluded, provision and appropriation rules are adapted to site-specific situ-
ations, decision making is participatory (democratic), monitoring is done by
agents that are designated locally, some form of local court or other conflict
resolution arena exists, graduated sanctions for infringements are used, and
outside government respects CPR institutions (Ostrom, 1990). In the con-
text of communal pastoral range lands, McCarthy et al. (2001) also found
that cooperation is positively related to factors that increase the profitabil-
ity of livestock, but negatively related to the total number of households,
the use of community pastures by non-community members, and the het-
erogeneity of wealth within the community. They suggest that, given the
importance of mobility and the poor suitability of most land for cropping in
such communities, measures to offset the increasing densities should focus
on improving the capacity of communities to cooperate and mitigate the
impact of heterogeneity on that capacity, and on improving market access to
improve cooperation and increase incentives to sell stock in good as well as
bad years. Pender and Scherr (1999) also identify moderate or lower pop-
ulation density, distance from urban market, and literacy level as factors
positively associated with local organizational development for resource
management.
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